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The subject of mergers first became of interest to me
in July of 19 54 xvhen, as part of an assignment at Northeastern
University, a paper on the topic was required. The Preface of
that work stated that it was hoped further study could justify
more valid assumptions.
An opportunity for such study was soon available wben
the subject was considered for thesis work in partial satisfac-
tion of a Master of Business Administration Degree at Northeast-
ern University. However, the scope was determined to be of un-
manageable length for such a purpose, and additional time was
necessary if the study was to be accomplished. The completion
of the project was assured when the extent of the undertaking
was recognized at George Washington University. The required
time was granted by allowing the thesis to be submitted in two
parts to cover two term papers necessary in partial satisfaction
of a taster of Public Administration Degree at that university.
In addition to the problem of time, the study could
not have been undertaken had it not been for the inspirational
leadership of Dr. Vincent ?. Wright, Director of the Graduate
School at Northeastern University and Dr. A. Rex Johnson, Directcjr
of the Navy Graduate Comptrollership Program at George Washington
University. I am deeply indebted to these men for their help and
understanding. A special note of gratitude is due ?r. Richard
Norman Owens of George 'Washington University -/ho gave gener-
ii

ously of his time and criticism. In addition, personnel in the
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have been
most cooperative and offered many suggestions along with tech-
nical advice.
In making investigations for the original paper it was
found that considerable writings had been accomplished on the
various segments of the subject. Economic books offered a
wealth of information on monopoly and competition. Law journals j
U, S, Statutes, and books on government regulation of business,
fully covered the law, Kany writers had attacked the problem of
concentration of industry as a result o f* mergers, and business
periodicals had a considerable number of articles on the reasons
for the present wave of mergers. In no place, however, was any
current writings found covering the full subject of mergers,
per se.
It was difficult to understand such a lack of coverage
on so important an aspect of business. From a student's point
of view such writings were eagerly sought for a full but easy
understanding of the basic concepts of the subject, ka a result
of this fruitless search the form of the thesis took shape.
Considerable space is devoted to the early history of mergers
while the law of r.ergers is developed from its inception. This
coverage was deemed necessary to bring into focus conditions that
may have set the stage for the present merger movement,
A large portion of the material represents information
from secondary sources and liberal use is made of footnotes.
Considerable insight has been gained, however, from personal
interviews with senior corporate officials from forty of the two
iii

hundred largest industrial firms in the United States. These
officials were most generous in answering questions; however,
misunderstandings may have resulted from the interviews. If so,
any errors of interpretation are entirely my responsibility and,
therefore, no authority is given for any quotations from this
study where such interviews are discussed.
It is hoped, that by the form of presentation and the
inclusion of current Information gained from industry and govern-
mental agencies, the T-ork will contribute to an understanding of
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"Mergers of major companies are the more Important
business events of any period." Commercial and Finan-
cial Chronicle, Larch 26, 1953.
Nineteen hundred and fifty four can go down in history
as a year of decision relative to the future of big business vs.
the United States Goverment. Hot that any such momentous decis-
ion was made, only that it was a year when scarcely a day passed
that the subject of big business did not make the headlines. The
Federal Trade Commission was making investigations, the economists;
were preaching pure competition, and the leading business publican
tions were carrying article upon article having to do with mergers.
It is unlikely that 1955 will bring forth any neiy sol-
utions or radical departure fron the old. The hue and the cry is
expected, to go on unabated.
The Problem
The basic problem is one of definition. What do we
want from our economy and what do we expect of it in the future?
mary Jean Bowman and George Bach aptly states
Host Americans apparently still believe strongly in
capitalism and the virtues of a free private-enterprise
economy, yet the scope of government action beyond the
regulatory duties prescribed by laissez-faire advocates
has grown steadily and rapidly. How far should it go
?
what are the social objectives and what do we want the
private-enterprise system to achieve?-*-
ary Jean Bowman and George Leland Bach, Economic Analysis
and Public Policy
,
(l»;ew York: PwnticO-Hall, 194-9), P. 579.

2It appears that the extent of effort by the government
to prevent mergers, and to control business if continued or if
successful, would in itself destroy our competitive market and
possibly establish a monopolistic economy. On the other hand,
if concentration in industry came down to only a handful of the
fittest, <»culd monopoly result, nd if ild it destroy the
economy of the nation as '.s-e know it? How should cur efforts be
expended to preserve the unprecedented growth this nation has
experienced and at the same time control this undefined phenome-
non known as "big business," if in fact it should be controlled?
Not only is it almost impossible to define the problem
but even the segments of the problem become embroiled in contro-
versy, ./hat is competition? hat is free-enterprise?
constitutes good mergers or bad mergers? When might a monopoly
be good for the public? These are just a small portion of the
questions left unanswered. Professor : .. . Adelman, one of the
most prolific writers in the field, says of this:
The most obvious conclusion is also the most do ing
one: how little we know of our industrial structure snd
its evolution. . . . Not only sre the most important b sic
data not available; we have scarcely even begun to decide
hat questions wc t answered.^
This was nut even more pointedly by J. D. Glover ^hen
he stated:
We do not know nearly as much about the corporation
3S we should. Our libraries contain more concrete clinic 1
detail on distant primitive tribes - their motives, v:::lue
system.,, ;nd methods of c I zing activity - tlran on the
%• A* Melman, "The Measurement of Industrial Concen-





corporation in our midst, , . . • Titles, generally
,
conceive the nature and the functioning of one of
the most distinguishing features of - eiety -
e business cor; -oration .3
These ominous warninga by res ters in the field
are, of course, not without good foundation of ot. One of the
aajor roblerrs for the study in the year 1';., is that the irost
current statistical data i ;ble, with minor execptions, is from
the 1947-195G period as *h of is in dispute. The Federal
Tr: ission, itself, ha* fli flculty keeping track of mergers
and their effects on concentration in industry. In 1952 x'ol.
chided the FTC in this respect by noting:
Incidentally, the FTC report on .erger movement,
issu . itained the totals* This
prompt publication was very welcome. But here it is 19>"'»
111 no figures j or the se of any
figures for the 1948 and later years. 4
In addition to the problem of numbers of oers, other
FTC facts and figures do not at all times tie into ones mare
available by certain periodicals, books, or research institutions,
and, by their own admissions, ' often appear only as estimates.
These factors l verall c ;.oarisons and conclusions difficult
at best.
ions
The first question that roust be 1 -cd is,
. D« Glover, T*ie Attack on Big business , (Norwood,
•saehussttt: The Plympton Preas, 195*), P* 290 >291
) o;-.cit ... p.V .
:>ral Trade Ion, T-e .ort on ?s in Cone
^atioiULn^i^aVtfAg^win£4JLSa5.,t9.J^7 . ^<LM%k R ashingtonj
Government nrinting Office, 1954), p. 16.

4constitutes a merger?" The word merger is defined in the
dictionary as, "the extinguishment of a lesser estate, right
or liability in a greater one. ... A combination of commer-
cial interests or companies in one." 6
The definition is more liberal than the standard
interpretations of business, in stating specific differences
among trusts, holding c ales, consolidations, combinations,
lgamations, mergers and acquisitions* These interpretations
don't often allow for the use of the all encompassing term
merger. Dr. Richard Owens in his Business Organization and
Combination
, quite properly t a tees some exception to the common
usage of the term and says, "the words consolidation, merger,
and amalgamation are often used inters] ;eably, but the best
usage seems to give them the distinct meanings indicated •""
Certainly trusts and holding companies would come under the
dictionary term of extinguishment of a right or liability in
a greater one, but their form and shape are considerably
distinct from the accepted usage of merger.
3"
• Fred 'eston mentions the results of market concen-
tration due to mergers8 and M. A. Adelman states "another wave
of mergers came in the period 1897-1903.
"
9 Both of these




(New York: Funk & Vvagnalls Company), 194.7-1950, p. 745.
Fichard Norman Owens, ; usi ae-.s Cra-;aisat,ioa a.>
Combination
,
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1.51-115^), p. 344.
eJ. Fred -eston, The Hole of Mergers in the Growth of
Large Firms . (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California






5comments encompass trusts and holding companies as well
mergers, amalgamations, or acquisitions. The Federal Trade
Commission recognizes four merger movements, ,<nd speaks of
"The underlying economic forces that appear to hare precipitated
the recent merger movement . f?11 The Department of Justice states
"each merger ..ill be weighed on its own merits, and no one
should jumpt to the conclusion all am re going to
be banned."^
Through the years the term "merger " has been so fre-
quently used by authors, the FTC, the Department of Justice, and
Business, to indicate all forms of business unit organization,
that it has become a generic term ana by necessity used in this
study in its broadest sense. In addition, most authors sake
little distinction in other terms and it will be noted that
combinations and cons lidations soon take on the same eonotation
as merger, although these terms are so used, it does not me
that the specific meanings of the various forms should not be
considered .no, therefore, they are given here.
The Trusts .—The trust device, well leno. id long used for
""other pur , involves the holding of roperty
by a trustee who has pc ser to administer it and
receive the income from it, both property and
income to be used by the trustee as directed in
the tru b creement. . . . The business truat
10Federal Trade Commission, "The Merger Movement"
( . shington, Government Printing Office, 1948), p. v.
^Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, "FTC to
Survey Mergers," (Washington: FTC October ^5, 1954), p. 5.
^^he Wall Street Journal, "Browne11 Formally Announces
Decision to Bar a Merger of Bethlehem and Youngstown," (New
York, October 1, 1954) .

6was ordinarily a corporate organization formed to
control a number of corporations through holding
their stock. The original ownera of the stock
turned their securities over tc the trustee
corporation, end received "trust certificates" on
which dividends were paid. They remained tech-
nically owners of the stock, but or to vote
was transferred to the trustee organization. 13
The holding cc: .- • r.ies .— The holding company is similar to
the trust. There is one primary difference. The
trust simply holds the shares of the controlled
companies as trustee; it does not own them out-
right. The holding company buys up securities to
get power over the companies that it wants to
control. As the name indicates, the holding
company typically o . ad hold,; securities of
other corporations; it frequently owns no land,
machinery, or i ther such operating property
itself. 3-*
Consolidations .-- A consolidation is the combining of
business units that formerly were independent
OOffljp dies into a single corporation. The con-
solidated company holds ana owns the assets or
ropertiea of the consolidating companies, not
their stocks. The companies that are ,b3orbed
cease to exist; their charters are surrendered
to the state that granted them, ana their corpor-
ate organizations are discontinued .15
Combination .— ;. combination may or may not take the form
of a consolidation. A combination is defined as
tv.-o or more previously independent firms united
by a charter obtained ea lly for that purpose
thus excluding purchases, exchanges of stock, and
holding companies.-1-6 This is a form of consoli-
dation.
Amalgamation .— This is synonymous with a combination.
?v'erger .— Besides the dictionary definition, it is normally
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6 in seeking an to the
problem when he taparted the advice that the information sought
war 11v unavailable "ho FTC wc -olcome b ^.nt\y
such as atlined* I e did believe, he at if avenues
of questions or problems to be investigated were opened, then
18
a contribution to the merger 1 b< ade*
->wens, 913 . c4t .
^^Discussions wit Ion BarneSj conomist,
Peden " , n, p. c,, personal interview,
August 19$4 #

8An additional warning was of a different nature but one
that seems most appropriate to t . tuay. ,. ' . Berle Jr.
vojced the follow J mi
Depending on his predilection, the student may conclude
th<- t the United States is traveling "The (st . i to
serfdom," or that it is by trial and error covering a
ssne method of preventing both t Lty ind the busi-
ness man from beir ort of blind economic force .*$
t does all this mean to the common man who, inciden-
lly, doesn't become 30 common when it is considered that it
is his future that is be: eternalned? This study is under-
taken to review the mass of contradiction that is before us,
and to present a resume of the problem with resulting recommen-
dations and conclusions from someone who is neither an eccnc,
preaching pure competition, a follower of socialism preaching
government intervention, or a business man desirous of protect-
ing his advances in competition. This common man is merely
desirous of protecting the heritage that is his in "the American
way of life."
19
A . A. Berle Jr., "The Measurement of Industrial
Concentration," The Review of Economics and t t: -tics,
Vol. EEXXV Mo. 1, February 1952, 7. 17 3.

OH I
HISTORY OF THE MERGER MCV 'T
"The house la certainly not a finished and furbished one -
there are too e !•: cu; ad too many unfulfilled
desiderata." Joseph A. Schumpeter
.
The history of American business during the past hundred
years makes inspirational reading. It is s history studded with
constantly changing patterns of doing business to meet the ever
growing problem of c tition. fhat's more, It is a history
of Americ ity, not just in the sense of innovation, but
in the larg< >e of increasing the st . rd of living in
fc bee;:. a the world over as "the American way of
life."
The Period from 1860 to 1891
In considering the history of merger,:, and their effect
on competition the belief is often expressed that they are a
product of modern business and born of the era of corporations.
Insofar as the present \ r:.-Mem is concerned that belief is
unquestionably correct but it Is more th ificant to
reflect that in the writings on the earliest crafts and guilds
there were reported stories of "getting together for the common
good." A Guild member who sold his wares below the .mount






Although the English common law, dealing *ith the
subject, was well understood and had been accented ai rt of
the community of business regulations in that country, it was
not until after the Civil r that "restraints of trade" were
considered as a problem in the United States* The increased
scale of manufacturing establishments and the birth of a great
many new industries soon led to activity in combinations of
business enterprise. In retrospect, it might be considered
that this was a natural reaction to the t . Larger scale
production required new financing, the new techni I innovations
required development, and the spreading railroad systems heralded
the possibilities of nation-wide distribution with the hope of
obtaining csntrol of the new markets.
It was in this age that the whisky, oil, sugar, aluminum
lead, steel, and rubber trusts, amidst none too profitable
publicity, took on the forms of monopoly.
The Public, Congress, and The American Federation of
Labor, were quick to grasp at this "monopolistic giant." la
1888, George C-unton wrote:
Indeed, the public mind has begun to assume te
of apprehension, lag tc alarm, regarding the
evil economics and social tendencies of these organiza-
tions . . . tne aoei 1 atmosphere seems tc be surcharged
with an indefinite, but une sable fear of trusts.
In addition, the Democratic platform of 1890 stated:
George Gunton, "The Economic ooial spect of
Trusts" Political Science quarterly, oeptember 1888, p. 385

11
. . . the interests of the people are betrayed v,hen
. . . trusts and combinations ire permitted to exist because
they "rob the body of our citizens by ftepriving them of the
benefits of natural oo .ition.
The answer of the Congress to these le was rapid
and what they believed to be positive. The Sherman Antitrust
.Act »aa p »ed La 189Q au it formal attempt to
regulate merger .
The Period from 1891 to 1919
The panic of 1393 put a sudden stop to all kinds of
co-iipany promotion and expansion. The Labor Commissioner for
the United Itatea O-cvernraent stated at the time that ?'vie ,,ere
economically ed because we had finished the job of
invention ,.txon." 3 Little aid he dream that a few
ye-jrs later the gti -test ; ; ce of business firms in history
was to commence as a result of the "invention and production
of the era •"
The First I ovement
ile authors varj c ! rably on the exact number
and length of the various merger movements, it. Lly
acceptca that tnc first one of major importance began in 1898
and continuea until 1905 or 1904* Henry Meager and Charles
Gulick, Jr. pointed ti:e following picture of the prior merger
movement:
'ILomc!.: II. &&cl£ee, The ,:.ri',>.i:.*l convent' ons and Platforms





pp. ; 3STJ £41.
:5Haroli 0. KouXton, America's .,eelth/The Last 100 Yerr a
And The IText
,




The organization of trusts which occured during the
years from 1879 to 1896 barely attained to the dignity of
a movement. Altogether there were not more than twelve
Important organizations formed duri ig the entire period and
their total capital »a el] undo] ,000,000,000. The
contrast between the i ular formation of
trusts in these years ad the second trust movement that
set in afjer the return tc prosperity in 1897 was very
strlfcj
The factors gitlfi retus to increased gains in
concentration during the 1898-1903 term are generally conceded
to be:
1. Relaxation of incorporating 1 >a«
i. Frivi-i- .ed by Jersey lav. for companies
to hold stock in another corporation.
3. Availability of national markets by transportation
4. Management's improved production techniques.
5. Economies of large scale production.
6. Development of the investment markets and the advent
of the investment banker.
7. Large financial gains to stockholders and promoters.
8. The Sherman Act
9. Tariff policies executed in the special inter*
of business.
10. Great nan innovations 3 jra of invention and
methods
.
ffhila soma of the above r is are self-explanatory
others require further consideration.
The relaxation of the laws of incorporation, as used
in this instance, largely concerns the aut] y to become c:
*Henry H. Seager and Charle: . G-ulick, Jr. Trust and
Corner ate Problems
,
(New York, 1929) p. 60.

13
Most states prior to this tine prohibited capitalization in
excels of from $l t000 t000, to •;>5, 000,000. With the gradual
repeal of these statutes, allowing unlimited capitalization,
growth v;as allowed bher ' ri >11< ; -; of securi-
ties. Other aspects, concerned the "place of incorporation,"
allowing companies to b Jersey Cor. oration, for example,
although operating in ark. IT Is alio te of less
restrictive laws when such t s advantageous to a new corpor-
ation.
The privilege ©w Jersey, allowing one
corpor-tioii to hold stock in another corporation, is credited
by some as being the greatest single contributor to the merger
movement, About the act, are" Mead comment;
For momentous consequesc* s, this statute of Hew Jersey
is hardly to be equaled in the annals c islation . .
the little State of Jfew ^orsoy, containing twe ercent of
the population and one of the
wealth of the [Jnlte< ., by the simple act of amending
its corporation law, nulified the antitrust laws of every
St. ate hie
Stories of large financial gains to stockholders and
promoters ran r mpant throughout the recorded history of the
period and did much to add to the distaste of "big business."
Willi,' B : vis's viov;s on this are typical of any:
These trusts ier oy bankers, and the
securities they offered were so thoroughly watered that it
took a generation of ind growtl tion
>Ed^ard Sherwood Mead, Trust T §., (New York?
ton, 1920), pp. 39.

14
of a ;r to dry them out. s
The sherman let of 1890 was passed witb t expecta-
tions of being a cure-r-11 fcr roblem of trusts and ccn-
iraciea in restraint of tr.de. Hot only did the Mew Jersey
l"Vv, hi.ch 11© ea corporations to hold stock in other ccr:-ora-
ticno, ir-ict:' ©ally nullify the act but the act itself gent
lone way toward causing merger,,. It seems impossible that such
a ox coul
. but SB axamin tion of the facts positively
indicates that cor. Lr eie DUtl : ,sd by to ct became leg
*hen ..cc;_: , o of merger, .hot couldn't be
done by five firms getting together in s conspiracy in n restr.sin"t
of trade" could be ace i by the same five firms consoli-
7ting into one firm*
The period lso ^ignificsnt for many new inventions
and improvements on existing ^eehnS . rotable




tors. The moving picture, x-ray, tele ..
I telegraph cable,
and the airplane »©re 11 art of tl i riod . In addition,
Frederick Taylor brought to industry nets production ideas, and
Ford introduced the proauction line technique. Manufacturing
workers increased during the 1811-1910 eriod by forty per cent
and productivity v, . . . ed by sixty-seven percent. 8
°,iiliiom B. Harris, "The Urge to Merge," Fortune t
(November 1954), p. 10; .
7Temporsry Nations! Economic Committee , Re cord of
Proceedings , December 1, 1938 to January 20, 1019, Part I,





, pp, 15, 17.

15
notwithstanding the stunning advances the country was
making, the growls ' re beginning tc hurt. id
of this:
.... ?cur years 1 v uffieed to reorganize the Xi
ing Industries of the Ouited States along lines of consol:
tion. . . . Hardly an industry has esei ped . . .9
There is considerable difference of opinion among »riter|s
to the exact number of combines formed durin- t". is period.
The differences in count , ver, .ere not so much a matter
of mathematics as of the contir problem of what we are
counting.
The C Bureau, In Its compilation of consolidations,
listed 185 combinations formed up tc June 30, 1900. l0 Luther
Conant, Jr., published a list in March of 1901 which contained
241 cons ' x Drior to 1900, "of which 87 or over one-third
were organized in 1899 ." C t observed:
The movement in that year in fact developed into a
craze on the part of the amoters and vendors to
unlr : the public ormous prices. f,li
The Census listing brck-e the 185 consolidations down to
65 as having beer rlor to 1897, with the balance having
been formed between 1897 and 1900. The br< of Conant'
figures were cor r ble considering the additional numbers
reported .
sad, od .cit .
»
p. 2
lOTwelfth Ci of t x tc , 1900 Vol. VII,
Part I, as cited by • . Adela , .rement of Industrial
centration, w heview of lioonomics a:iu t-tistics, Vol.XXXIII,
November .1951, p. 27C
ULuther Conant, Cr. Publications of the American ;,tatis -
tical Asso., .broh 1901 as citea by Ooora.0 .. atv.ca-rira; ia ""four
on the t of tr 1 Cui. centra tion' r ihe
Kevieiv of Ijc^lclic,
.
i.d ..tatio ij ca , Vol.XXXIV, No. 1, February
1954, - . 162.

16
The Census Bureau and Conant re corted only through the
year 1900. One of the most often quoted uthcrities on the
numbers of consolidate is John Moody, instate*
ing listing of oyer 300 of them for tfc riod ending in 190! .
Of 92 1 mergers studied by Moody, 78 are reported to hove
resulted ta t i 1 of 5C per cent re of the outrut of the
industry.
Tb/ I 5 of the 'ire business org ons
of the United Stato ^rs t t ople didn't like
what they saw* Of thi:; Saoi
: 3 never in 11 the ret of in >rial history
have such comprehensive and significant changes in the
structure of peaceti :..y taicen pluce in a period
so short. ^
The effects of the ne a concentration in industry were
becoming apparent and efforts were being expended to obtain an
amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act. 4 All such efforts
were unsuccessful; however, 1914 saw the passage of tvvo impor-
tant pieces of legislation. The Clayton Act was introduced and
passed to prohibit, among other things, "the sit ion of
stock or other share capital, when such ic:uisition would! sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly."
The Federal Trade Commission Act was introduced, and passed,
J-'-John Moody, The Truth 4houi; Trusts
,
(Hew York: Moody
Publishing Co., 1904), -T). 486, 487.
^^George . • Stocking, Four Cc ments on "The Measurement
of Industry cT'ition," The Re vie. i f economics .nd
otnti
-
oics , Vol. jjullv, Ho. 1, February 1952, p. 1S1.
l - 1






as a means o: mding ,rol over practices in restraint of
trade, as well as to form a body that could undertake investi-
gations In the public interest. Both t; 3 will be
explained further in the Cnaptar on "The Law of Mergers."
Al in the ease of the Sherman Aot, th- aa of
the Clayton .'»ot apoaaora tare soon dimmed. It aid not become
the power it *as expected to be. In addition, the Federal
Trade Commission, which has been organized under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, was having its difficulties ;.i th the
courts. The end of this period . j if leant for the reason
that mergers had come to a standstill.
The Period from 1919 to 1941
Although considerable merger activity was noted in
1920 and 19£1, it was not until 19S4 that it again for. ad
what could be dc ted • movement. >«hile the "aeo«
merger movement" was not to be compared te the aerlier one, it
3till aaa of lasting importance.
The Second l/erger Movement
The principal forces of the period appeared to be the
great technological galna by Integration, the advent of nation
advertising by radio, making bigness a requirement if production
and distribution were to be of advantage, and the bull
market of security prices, which whan comp t the earlier





fc] 8 of 9102 bu 9 firms throu
the pree with ever S00C the
1928-1929 boom (Table I). ti mfc r : ly
larger than that noted in the 18 f.
,
J ust be remem-
bered th lth the ,„rowth of the nation the number of
iness firms /.'is al e : , rel tive importance
a not ced . &• A« id I te , however,
-ed c 19£4- £ eriod may be
regarded as proved . . .'* 15
.i depression of the early thirties is
ucted by some authors aa beiii, r le for additional ccn-
solidatlon
,
the actual numbers were so small that the 1932-1941
p> riod" is listed as being memorable for ence of merger
activity. Kotwithst thii
,
the era is noted for the con-
sider ble umber /iness cycles, competition,
concentration in ." try, no" she re ults of such activity
a the economy of th tion« nding of the
tempo of the ' - ~ ' f . . Berle and Gardener C
.
,
re cited. They said in I. :
Just U qtc th of the bis companies
romlse for the future? Let us project the trend of the
gr cf . . . the twenty years 1909 to 1929, then 70 per
cent of all corporate activity would be curried on by two
httJ corporations by 1950. If the more rapid rates of
rowth from 1924 to 19^9 'were maintained for "the next twent;
years, 85 percent of corporate wealth would be held by the
two hundred huge units* It would take only forty years at
the 1909- 9 rate v, Lrty years st the 1924-1929








industrial activity to be rbed by two hundred giant
companies. 16
As in the past, when public reaction was hostile to
big busj i the dictation movements, the government
took steps to balance the situation. Thus enters the history
of the next epoch.
The ~eriod from 1941 tc the Fro3ent
The inoae ;u:cy of the staff and limitations of finances
seriously : ie FTC in its enforcement of the Clayton
Act and the Federal Trade Commission ; l>ct. The Department of
Justice had been no better off in their ability to prosecute
under the Sherman Act. Of this Corwin D. awarda said in 1941:
In spite of the expansion of the last four years, the
ititru : vision's appropriation is still less than that
for the Institution, and this sum is obviously
not enough to prevent monopolies and restraints of trade
throughout vei Loaa industry. J
These ! ted an almost insurmountable disadvantage to
government action. In 1941 new life «as ut into the FTC
th an expanded staff it c into all branches
of industry, a tc take tin less aggressive method of
waiting for c 3 case to case basis* The Department
of Justice also shared in this staff increase but only to the




I erle rmd Gardner C. : ms, Thc_ ;,^sr...: Cci , or






17Cor . , 'The Hi titrust procedures,"
in C J. Priedrioh sua E • on, Aublic Policy (Brattle-
boro: Vermont Printing Co., 1941), p. 4.
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The Third Merger Movement
This acti.cn was well timed as the year 1941 indicated
that another serge? movement was underway although authors disa-
gree as to the size and significance of it. The FTC reDcrted
£450 absorptions during the period 1940-1947. 18 although this
figure doesn't agree fable I which list . Commenting
en the liter f this action, M. A* Sfielman discounted its
importance. Ee said!
The .v<- innual number of mergers in 1945-47 as com-
piled by the FTC, was about one third as hi
and was exceede 10 cut of the I rs 1919-31. Moreover
there were more firms in existence Sur biie 194.0*5 so teat
the rate of merger soulS need to be adjusted down.
/-•s in the past, eaoJ increase in merger activity
met with public demands for more controls. This period wa3 to
be no exception. After many years of debate and two attempts
which failed, 1950 saw the pi e of an Amendment to the Clayto
fcCt. The Amended Section 7 now brought "acquisitions of assets"
thia the prohibit; of th« Iv. by the following languages
That no corporation In o 3 Cquire, direct-
ly or indirectly, the ehole or any part of the stock or othei
share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction!
of the federal Trade Commission sb o uire l hole or
:y • rt of the assets of another cor engaged also
in commerce, .here in any line of commerce in any section of|
the country, the effect of such : be substan-
tially to lesser competition or tend to create a monopoly.
The FTC believed t last thr t the loophole of the Clsytoja
.ct had been plugged.
p. 17.
^Federal Trade Commission, The Merger h.^veront , op .cit .
Adelmen, op .cit .
, j . .
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The Present 1 r Movement
No real breaking point can be made between the third
merger movement and the present one, unless 1949 were chosen, as
the lovv point for the period* It might even be better to conside.
them as one. However, the size and extent of vvhat has been hap-
pening recently is of such magnitude that it deserves separate
consideration.
The great number of consolidations th t have taken place
during the past five years can only be compered to the 19^5-1930
period in all of recorded history. The FTC reported that for the
years 1950-53 an average of 700 firms a year .»ere lost through
merger •'^ It is considered important to re -emphasize that no
absolute totals of mergers could be found even at the commission
In reference to the FTC figures, we only have to look at their
annual report of 195£, and note that they speak of instituting
"a program of listing and making preliminary examination of all
mergers within the Commission's jurisdiction. T,<c*
Another warning, as to possible misinterpretation of the
increase in mergers, oust be injected. The. rate of mergers or
numbers mean little, without an understanding of the resulting
effect on concentration, competition, public policy, or consumer
benefits. Of this, the Chairman of the FTC made the folic
comments:
Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission . 1950,
1951, 1952, 1953, (Washington: Government Printing Office,
June 30, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953).
£ -*
v,r;nu-'l I<enort of the Federal Trhde Cr-.-unisaion , 198
op .c: t . | p .31
.

. . . these figures throw no light on the magnitude or
significance of the mergers involved or the extent to which
they affect competition in specific at areas* . . . 'hat
ia needed is malysis of mergers in recent years to deter-
mine their effect on competition in specific market -areas.
fe believe that information can be obtained to show the
effect on eompetition of the current wave of merger., and
10 to determine the nature of the wave nd the forces t;
underlie it.
An example of just one of the c arations that would
have to be examined ia comparing this period with uiy prior one
would be the growth in numbers of manufacturing firms. In 1935
there .ere 200,000 such firms, while in 1950 there were approxi-
mately 300,000, notwithstanding all the loss through absorptions
by merger.
History has a way of repeating itself, and the present
merger movement was not to be without its investigation. ;.t the
time the "^TC commented on the significance of the mergers in the
present wave, it also announced "a speedy but thorough economic
Invest Ion of recent corporate mergers and acuuisitions ."
The purpose cf this Investigation was stated to be "To provide
documented facts on mergers for the information of the Commission
the Department of Justice, the Congress, and the public.
The history of the merger mcr % .ould not be complete
without c asidering the impact of the various pieces of legisla-
tion and the separate invest!,: tions conducted by the FTC and the
federal Trade Commission, Press Release "FTC to Survey
Mergers," op . c i
t
. t p. £.
Federal Trade Commission,
j
9 :rt -. . C^ ... -.-j.j in Concen -
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Department of Justice on their avowed purpose of restricting
mergers, concentration, and monopolistic practices. These
topics will be discussed under "The Law of lergers," but for the
moment it can be stated that the agencies of Government h;.ve
gained little.
Table I indicates a sharp drop in the 1954- rate of
mergers, although some of these have been of massive size.
Could this indicate that mergers have cyclical tendencies?
Could this be the beginning of the end of this cycle?





NtJMBEB Of ] m COHCEKKS ACQUIRED OF I GOD
1st 2nd 3rd 4th dual
Year usrter Quarts? u ?irter Quarter Tot ' 1
1919 57 82 147 128 411
1920 £09 186 188 166 749
1921 184 99 80 2 485
1922 86 53 82 76 297
1923 84 67 44 105 300
1924 110 71 87 85 353
1925 124 104 127 175 530
1926 286 £36 171 146 839
1927 161 247 2£0 213 841
1928 197 315 S42 274 1,028
1929 349 395 312 160 1,216
1930 204 237 156 189 786
1931 163 142 87 71 463
1932 7 102 46 40 195
1933 19 43 33 12 107
1934 19 25 34 23 101
1935 36 27 38 24 125
1936 39 25 27 32 123
1937 32 27 29 31 119
1938 32 20 22 33 107
1939 24 22 16 25 87
1940 29 45 30 36 140
1941 fiCj 23 24 42 111
1942 19 17 31 51 118
1943 44 43 47 79 213
1944 68 73 79 104 324
1945 59 53 79 142 333
1946 95 132 109 83 419
1947 98 97 84 125 404
1948 65 81 60 59 265
1949 37 35 30 35 137
1950 42 51 50 57 200
1951 117 179 205 02 703
1952 189 171 244 ±8 82
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"On flfall ' treat there's a saying tb R epidemic of mergers
marks the beginning qf the end of a boom. MByte 80 in. the
-.-at, but this round looks different. It's bein^ f




It would be im- Lble to a iate deoiai.cn
to whether mergers are good or bad sithout understanding the
reasons for them. kihile it may be claimed that the actual causes
can never bo known, too* of those back of the present trend are
so obvious that they can not be disputed.
That corporations have ^been guilty of many monopolistic
practices over the years cannot be denied. Much of the criticism
of trusts and mergers was well deserved and it will be up to the
business men, himself, to prove his present ease, or possibly
up to the public to disprove it. Perhaps only history will give
the answer but when the time does come, it is doubtful that i
i^ro will appear mite as disiB ) . --.'.:• a Harris describes them
in the "second merger movement;"
Corporations were merged to provide securi-
ties fcr culation-aad -ubllc. Stocks of merged oompani|ei
aold .uickly -t faugi premiums. . . . -hen the c me it
covered that much of t : . evil, rticu-
rly the ublic-utiiity holding-company debentures
i preferred stocks. msulls and "the He I he
period and the I ith them, rut mil Street
under a cloud from which it has never fully emerged. f,i
"H-Iarri.
,




The Makers of mergers
The present merger movement appears to lack its Insulls
and Hopscns. It also la Lacking in the interest of the powerful
financiers from fall Street who are so often characterized as
wolves. It would be naive, however, to believe that there wasn't
some high finance behind the ability to buy corporations at a
cost of |100,000,000. or to imagine that there were not some
experienced financiers patting the Lnstions together. It
would be Just as naive to accept the idea that if evil forces
were actually doing the "business" that the chdogs of public
interest wouldn't have ferreted them out by now.
Like any successful business, however, as industries
grow the need for a broker develops so also as mergers become
successful, a function for brokers appears. Consequently, at
this time, many persons propose mergers to corporate managers.
Most of these persons do little good for themselves or the corpora
tions they approach. The proposing of mergers for the sake of
merger is bad, both for the reputation of business as a whole
and for the firms so merged. Few, if any, of these promoters
could effect mergers of major cor or tions.
This does not mean, however, that mergers have not been
engineered. Reputable firms have been required to cffer service
in the intricate business of merging American inciuatry. Bankers
aid be remiss if they did not offer assistance, for the protec-j-
tion of both their own investments ana their customers' intei
In addition, the corner ations , themselves, go not always have

8J
the required "know-how" to provide the means or preparation for
their known requirements. It is at this point that they often
require the aid of i nment consultants. Some consulting firms
have set up full departments oc handle the needs of their clients
Cther reputable c asulting firms re e< ually making studies
for determining values of companies vroposed for merger. The
large corporation, itself, has been so bombarded vvith such re-
quests that it often requires depar be established to
deal with them. For example, the Comptroller of Allied Chemical
& Dye Corp., indicated recently that opportunities for merger
were presented daily.'"
ile the merger broker must be considered as being in
the present picture, a c reful re of 11 the articles per-
taining to the reasons I of the unicm
,
well as interviews
with corporate officials could not help but bring out the conclu-
sion that the n ^rnents of business are the dominant proponents
in the present marriages of business enter; rises.
Types of Mergers
There are four general eatagorlea of mergers. They are
known as the horizontal, vertical, conglomerate, and allied.
The FTC, while recognizing the four, actually lists mergers only
under the three categories of horizontal, vertic tl ,nd conglomer-
ate. The sllied are placed in the horizontal group which accountjs
for 60 per cent of the total, while the other two types account
^'Discussions with 7* L. Linton, Comptrol] er , Allied
Chemical & Dye Corp., personal interview, August, 1954.
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for 20 per cent each.. 3 Each of these is briefly outlined.
The Horizontal Merger
A consolidation of business enterprise is said to be
horizontal when the bus sea carry on production of the same
product or the same stage in the production of some product.
For example, when allied Chemical purchased Mutual Chemical the
merger was horizontal for the reason that Allied gained nothing
for its own plants. It was merely the addition of another firm
doing a chemical business at the same stages of production. The
fact that Mutual manufactured a proauct that Allied, itself, did
not make has no importance in discussing the type of merger,
although it is a major consideration in presenting the reasons
for merger.
The merger of Packard and Studebaker is another illustra<
tion of a horizontal merger. In this case the products were
identical, although in different styles and price ranges. The
products were identical because they served the same purpose.
The Vertical Merger
A merger of business enterprise la I a vertical
when it involves the control over two different stages of pro-
duction. Bethlehem steel represents a completely integrated
corporation as it controls the manufacture listrlbution of
the raw material from prooessi : through to the finished product.
The entry of Pittsburg x-late Glass Cc . into the chemical field
by Barging with Southern Chemical, to gain a supply cf soda ash
for the Baking of U . .. le of s vertical merger and
•^Federal Ion, "The erger Movements




The Standard Oil Company of Ohio in entering the transportation
and refining fields for the production, processing, and distribu-
tion of their products made for vertical integration.
Vertical mergers oan gc eit< ] toward the sales
room, or backward to the source of suppl: .
The Conglomer orger
r Is made by join 3 npanl
engaged in busine. Lae fcjfc t T€ . rel tionship to each
other, and forming the results of the tions into operating
holding companies sitfi each unit beir. ined as a division.
The acquisitions of the American Home Products Corporation are
examples of conglomerate mergers. This corporation consists of
fifty subsidiaries engageu in the manufacture and sale of b,000
products in many unrel ted fields such as chemicals, food special
ties, points, insecticides and cosmetics. 4
The Allied Merger
merger is saj Hied if the merged firms produce
different commodities or services but the is cturing process
or c; annels of distribution are the same. The acquisition by
General Foods Corporation of Maxwell Icuse Coffee, Calumet baking
powder or Walter Bakers ohocol I re examples of allied mergers,
"lied mergers ere a form of her:' vement but have individ
ity of their
^Federal Trade Conmissicn, Tit ;,> r; or > ovement , op.cit .
,





Reasons for Mergero v
In considering eifie .merger, many reasons may be
involved. In other cases it might well be that there y«as but one
p namcunt motive f rty. It la because of these condi-
tions tnat the merger reasons given here are grouped in broad
categories with examples cited of various pertinent cases.
For Tax Savings
Tax laws of the United t Government have been subject
to continual demand for change. Pi bly in no other corner of
the 1c tive arena have pre .sou re groups Qeen so active in
demanding "special considerations* It is lexical, however,
to see the Congress pees laws in an attempt to restrict mergers
and at the same time pass laws that encourage them.
Tax savings come under four general descriptions. One is
the estate tax, the second the "loss carry-back" tax, the third
is the taxation on dividends and the fourth is the tax writeoff.
The estate tax .—Having an estate liquid enough to pay
Inheritance taxes is becoming one of the most difficult problems
to the owners of business. The economist dreams of a system of
competition re there are many competitors, rone of a size t
ecu big business, and 13 «orkin ; In sb t is termed
pure competition. Facta contradict this dream. The business
., whe ! kept .5 thin the bounds of pure competition, leaves
financial ruin for his ce ny ad I after his death. This
non-fictional business man has introduced his e piti 1 and kne -
thrcu I ut hie llf a seel firm r ; tnd roeper.

Ob consultation with his tax advisor he soon finds that the heri-
tage he will leave is in the form of estate taxes, that appr<
confiscation -of his life-time effort. Many businesses have been
sold to meet these tax;
,
1th the often, result t i t fine, eompet
ltive fir ore lost tc the ccmmunilty . .. t is the easiest way
out of this dilerpjna? The answer is ie - merger*
In the previous example of merger ac ,y between Allied
Chemical ana 1 Chemioal th« reason for t; c ^ers of Mutual
c d be aut down under the heading of estate taxes* Mutual was a
family owned cr^ oration t.h a grown to d: ;hed success*
That was its error I If death preceded merger the work of a life-
time would be interupted dur reorganization or liquidation. 5
Richard Smith, reporting in fortune , left little doubt
that one of the ailing res, b Dlln Chemioal ited
Msthieson Chemical the fact that 58 per cent of the Clin
stock, uorth over one hundred millici. dollars closely held
v»ithin the family. 6 Quoting villiam Harris in Fortune , again,
we see the specter of tax. ^»hen commc on the merger of
Benson & Hedges with Phillip Morris he not*-
Bedges, salei iliia in T 5o, was run by 7£ year old
Joseph CullmMi. The Cullman r s family control of the corpora
tion was such that should Jose allmaj 9 cor. oration
probably aould have had to be liquidated at great embarrass-
ment to the Cullmans . The llquj n estates
easily obtained by merger. 7
OW does the merger help this robiem? The answer is
too simple* The owners of Mutual Chemical receivea share;-; of
,-
5Linton, op.clt .
3Ric: istin Smith, "The eal,"
Fortune
.
t 1954, . 1.10 ff.
7TIarris, on .cit .
, p. 106.

Hied Chemical &, Dye atook in return for the total assets and
stock of the ooi a. ill go on indefinitely, the
itual nam* will continue, the community ibllc benefits will
continue, but the f-mily sill have liquid 3] r 3 cf Allied i
which tt bate t stes* The only change
is that ' utual ...ill be cper t. division of allied Chemical
& Dye Corp. 8
Loss crry-back tax .— fter many years of study in the
•.•counting profession a student would have difficulty in facing
the fact that losses are profits, and defunct corporations ready
for bankruptcy re ,orth many millions cf dollars. Only the most
modern of text books would carry this latest twist to the old
ideas that profits are profits losses are lo
The tax laws of our country, in de ith the business
Ban, are de ted uite fairly to aut the burden of tax en his
average earnings over a period. Thus if he reported a profit of
$100,000. last year, and paid a tax of s 50,000., aid this
year reported a loss of $100,000., he would be entitled to a
refund of the |50,000« as hi verage profit ever the tv»o year
period was zero.
Tho process aae, alte simple. The ion, however,
arise. it how a loss can be bo rofit« This comes
ut .-.hen the business man has only lease ad no profits, or
if he has profi ad through merger sells the business at a loss
1Ithough other reasons were cited, the carry-back was one





millions of dollars, while /,'illys was doing quite
11 aa a growing automobile manufacturer. By process of merger
the company then had large 1 eli im a3 refunds from the
! orm:iL n the t- are .. : lid by fil3 . In ' rtieular c
it la reported ,. soon had
sea to contend with also*
To better expli in the c rrj - cess ,e
study used
;
-" :c te i ings of the scheme.-*-13
This ' nee deal: lith the carry-back loss, the aefunct company,
te taxet .
The case concerns firebrick: c ny whose stock was
closely helci by the family. Due to their fear cf estate t.xes,
they desired to liquidate the best they coulcl but their asking
price cf $4,000,000. in stock of a strong corporation was too
much for possible purchasers . This situation did net disturb
the modern accountant who was used to de see j profits
The buying firm actually paid only $1,700,000. in cash, yet the
family gathered all. the aet cash that they caul;. ,ibly have
receive. they scld the company for the original asking price
cf |4, 000, COO. stock less the .r cent capital is tax and,
in addition, still h oir c , '. The process ,uite
iple
.
Th sets of the firebrick c ; sere ic .aired for
the $1,700,000. cash. :.i ssets were e rried on the books of
the firebrick company at i be value of .,700,000. The
Why
,
!f bul i lie,. . . t:<-: , ::arch 18,
1953, p. 52.
Harris, op.cit . , a. 104.
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purchasing company, therefore, bought assets valued at
,700,000. for only $1,700,000 or a |2, 000,000 possible profit.
This in itself was reason e v for th t bo merge. The
the buyin lj loss to the
Ily im ily plied for their 1c
carry-back -rior taxes paid and the Treasury 3 :nt
"donated*1 the balance of the purchase price to the family in the
form of a rebate s ,000. fhj ive the family a net c
sale of |3,200,000. for their i >t - ,000,000. net h ]
the ! .d for stoc I they still held ble losses in the
form of the useless corporation which itself could .sow be sold
aga3n.
Uk t ix figures being dealt with in this discussion are
not small. ffs hare only to look at the Howard - RK0 deal
to see the s1 - effects of tax loss, attar Pd Hughes
purchased -.11 the assets of RKO, the corpoi te shell that remained
orth orted $20,000,000. in losses.
The FTC can complain about t type of merger, and the
Treasury c . nue its endeavor to thwart it, but the pure
hematics still makes an intere story to the enterprising
bus3 a, story he is likely to continue to r
Thc ~i v" .,c-.r.c -a;: .— the least usi I, of tax
advantages to mergers, Is th over,
it is no less important to the li cu of taxc c use
of mergers
.
There r, two aspect tax* The first has to
do with double tax - , 1 to 1 come. This
advantage usually has more significance tc the corporation in
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which sizable hoi of stcc:< aye maint ined by a limited num-
ber of individual • gain this sight be the picture of the cor-
poration the economist would t if he *ere to Illustrate .
irfeet c I i. Th jrfect o ticn in the eyes i
the ac ist i nster in thi .? those who brtd it.
Reverting to t Lstory of the bu ' '.erpriae
founded by the family, >sllng ,*ith
estate t r xes, we .set fir . b is an t to the com-
ity, its plaee in the economy it e. nd
profit! re- suit. The T^ref j i~ re ait< Ly taxed by the






expansion of the business, end r kment to the stock-
holder . These dj re thea ecj 3 income to the
stockholder, tsion , i r« once more taxed*
n stock old to a degree that oo: of dividends c
easily bo det , such control often prefer.-; to restrict
this double taxation by leaving a gr of the in-
come in the business*
dditional, and more otent, re; £ , h ving these
profits in tht comes from the st elders who, having
sufficient , are in the tax bracket -re 111 left
on add it 1 income
.
vestigate th« tie history of the
growth of certain firms and note this brand t< evasion of
dividend t: . i The Pittsburg I be • r: inally a
mily cc.! . Codaj that famil; Imately three
million of oommofl stock in the corporation, and virtually
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has voting control. If dividends of that corporation ..ere c -
parable to the avert ge big 3 firm, the income of t;
recij-ient;; *ould eerti Lnlj 1 Ltive rates, returning
roxio ten U ... Littl Brest could be
uch t tors r ;ittle
business
•
the results in 1 c ttsbur* late
Gl jsl Divi< r« : - nuffi, . . aej is plowed
back int _cn, growth takes the fcrj :,
vvell as internal ex lion, and rofits to t3 tcckhol&ers t
form of c j .
.
rate of £5 percent
•
lrl Cnce more
the merger is stimulated by t: ,
!
The ton v.rits off .--Tax laws re been
quite favorable to merger in the allowance ;ci 1 sk wrlte-of
due tc wax necessity ox depletion of d tural resources. This
I . especially conducive tc vertical integi ^cn in the
crude oil field IlLcu. . .uch less cf : factor in .11 extract
tive industries*
McLean 1 writing in the Harvard Business Revic.
voiced the fol] .:
tax 1 .rilling
costs ire such tl ean ex 'I. iroducing oper -
tions on a very favorable basis at times Lt is 1 ad
to high tax rates. 12
11 M with T. ..'. Collins, General Personnel
Director 1 Pittsburg Plate Glass Go*, Pittsburgh, Pa., Personal
interview, November 1954.
**J . g. McLean and R. tf. Haigh, "How ess Corporations
Grovi,*' ..•.. x'u * u.^iness Key.i svn, Sfol. • • 5, ber-December
1954, r . 86.
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Bernard Hooey, Jr, a rec> rt on corporate taxa+
tion, disci iny great Importanoe to t e of the tax
torn Ij rgera,






Merger for Financial Reasons
Financial reasons for merger probably cover a multitude
of motives. Part of these considerations are combined with othei
aspects. Certainly all the factors under the section dealii
with tax can also '.-. id to be fin I. Those reasons won't
be repeated, but re no less a part of this section.
Finance in this instance concerns itself with the require
ments for c tal, idle funds, cost f . . for expansion, pur-
chase for profit, and fi tcial gains of promoters.
Requirement for c <oital .—One of the most difficult prob-
lems of the small business man is the requirement for capital in
which to finance research, e lion, or product introduction.
This weakness ear tiotcly be solved by merger ,ith a large well
financed concern. This was the case of O-Ccl-r. The initial
success of this small business was typical of the opportunities
available to men with ideas. As dec for the produet sharply
increased, il >rodueers were . cope with the require-
ments of ' , '-' , md subsidiary requir ts for
*%)j . odey, Jr
.
, at
Seeretarj rax Manager, Consolid diso ly of
York, pers'. i 1 Intel or, 1954.

launching or r ohip" into the busi rid* General Mills
came to the rescue with all the Indue j nece^ssry—money
position. *
Idle funds *--, It Plata Glass
la a of etion, further c at is deemed
le . The pi mat of p ble i »ment capit
in the I - iates is t lag y business firms
.is is nies. Inter-
6£ t rates sir avail
iey in t ble : looking for
.• • build
j
l us tries cr adding to the
output o of resent indi . " is rJ ley investment at
the very best. Inves - le
; ooneerns is o< rablj better fr return-on-in ent
st :iy ot if outlay. . ei . re b
logical result.
Ccst so siicr;:tions for expansion *—Qnee the decision
has been made t; firm's growth Indicates ex; Ion require-
ments uiid the fj ing i [liable, th< vision is hovi
to proceed. Steel felt the need bo match the
expansion of Unltec \ tea Steel the Liesti on was the one posed
above. To bulls a plant the sise of Youngs t< ould be
financially out of the question. At today's prices it would
just not be f€ ible« Youngstow ble, however, and
t "prist that was mutually beneficial to both although not
^-^y^ibn a 3m .11 Company Joins v_ at, du,,^ ,^ ,ee- ,




presently considered ccentable merger by the Department of
15Justice
.
Another fact for c ier t os la th.it wj ion by mer-
ger often does Got coat my money, while expansion by building
would be extremely expansive. Turnip"; to the Hied Chemical -
Mutual Chemical merger, it can be seen that in actuality the
acquisition of Mutual cost lliea 3 ttely nothing although it
was a most satisfactory sale insofar as j concerned.
Ulied paid for Hutual in in outright a- »h se In the form of
nreviously unissued common stoc'-c shares. $4te value of Allied
shares ter the -.eraser, t there :o
loss in value. Mo cash cxch la. 11U. 3 in the long
desired chromium ehemlc .1 field merely by the issu oe of stock.
Although the Comptroller '. ' firmly stated that this «
-lifie tion, the fact rem,! th t a .; Hied gone
! mark* j sell the shares of stock tc raise c 1-
tal cr had Hake Lt 1 so the ex-
tent of the ae ;uisition, it might net have red uite
much like n oversimplification.
Purchase for profit *--Po firm . aid a.;ait f©3 u ion
nagger . \ made f°r P^o:,' /. It would prefer t>
such reasons for k1 ction as expansion, diversification, cr
inte^ration. A good example of \ i ity, however, la
15Discussioris Aith Mr. !. H. Areherd, ssistant to




Linton, on .cit .
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the previously mentioned case of the firebrick company whose
asset.:, worth s3,700,00. were :?urc ; for .-1,700,000. and
returned - quick -r^fit &t S, 000, 000.
Oases like this are not nre. Fin oi 3 as of all
new irs were ealli - tt< tien to the fact that literally
hundreds of concern:- could have been purchased through stock
acquisition fluxing the 1940*s for less than the >uick assets'.
Finane
J
in to promoters .—In the history of the
merger movement v*e sen that, in. th< t, considerable importance
was attached to financial ^ : in to promoters. ,<e have also con-
sidered, in the present chapter, the subject of promoters as a
c use of Mergers* Hon we shall discuss financial gains tc pro-
meters to the situation as it is t resent.
The types of refits here are of t Lnds. If, in fact,
there was a broker i && s the re; u bl he merger was
first proposed might well have been the possible fees or market
reeiatlon in securities that f aid receive,
previously mentioned, it .' ubtful if thi :de many si -
nific mergers*
The c of finane
j
9 by stock
appreciation on ar. If a s or
unk firm joins t, there is no question but that there
will be, mors often than not, m isciaticn in t lue of
the shares of that corporation before r. Istory j ilso
foils, lell set >attern of m incre se in value of shares
whe nts Join giants* It sight - id that there is an
preciation in value when such a merger takea . although
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facta might be hard to prove. These two kinds of apprecia-
tion are :et made. Another type is tl it set by managers of
the merger in prieing the v lue of res or the r tio of
conversion on old ah res. b be very ten
little water In %) .. fter all, the man gers
U u l?y solid .-holders. C; edition, if they expect
close vote with the common stoekholc pprov 1 of the mer-
cer pi ns, little i; .ay to i
ill easier to sw allow .
Merger for Market Reasons
Under this heading will be considered r th, protection,
and market control.
Th e gr ow th a s a e c t a . - - No man would invest his heart and
30ul in the formation of a business without the hope of future
success and reward for his efforts. If there were to be no
reward there would be no incentive to work* .'nith few exceptions,
a business that isn f t growing isn't worth . . How companies
can best grow is the subject of this section.
The small business man looks with en\ry on his large com-
petitor who can run off the production lira sat quantities of
good quality products, although there ii lifferenoe of opinion
as to when economies in size cease, it is generally accepted tr
the email business can not always compete with its grown up bro-
thers, rational advertising encourages the consumer to buy
brand products* National channels of distribution get products
to the consumer when where he them. A desire for
r .ii a ion for economies or to meet sale id is com-
pelling. The methods of big business are not always the sure

7 to success, vait r ion . way toward j levins that 1.
If the acm 1.1 busi a 3oes have sin ide-
,
-uch 13 the
O-Cel-C case, by the time he ta ible to make th« -roduct and
successful! Pleat It, there aay no .1 be for it.
rrls f 1 ' '. when eommantj o
Small producing las, be 05? on
patents that are likely to become obsolete before they expire
are merged with o< lea having better I icilltias credit
so that the product can be exploited quiekly^?
The subjects of patents and research are often quite
painful to the scull business • The owners see their products
cease to be in demand; their machines obsolete by innovation;
and their sales transferred to competitors. In research, and
invention, the small business man cannot compete to protect his
investment
.
The drying up of raw mater i 3 no the loss of sources
of supply art .8 crippling to a corporation as polio could be to
a person. As if this were not enough, the effects of shifts in
markets and economic recessions, might well spell doom for the
f irm
.
This picture should not be taken to mean that the situ -
ticn Is all blaok« \m 11 business has flourished in the country
for q long ti ire far from departing frr free-enter-
prise economy. ?or the moment, however, the best protection yet
found for the rigors of growth is in the merger.
The buyer of a business that is growj ay
IV Tis, op.cit *
, p« 104

The t bw r, mas t 3
1
c the
protecting of his Interests so th t he has an e ir] chence with
hi;, ci Ltors.
' ."





jaliri - :' th
lven t( th< view of various
auth< r j i . . in I a relative
on
the increased ur
cc xh« Oolumfc I
utheri Company, i s ssburg ;e Glai
Co., which cie.j±w 3 uid chlorine, spe.-u sixty million dollars
in the last a years on aequisit and plant expansion* In
1946 this company stood third In iti lit years sixty-
million dollars later it was still third! 18 Referi tin to
the proposed Bethlehem-Youngstottn merger, it is evident after
U.S. Steel a oquired western steel plants and built the Falrle
plant in Bethlehem* a back yard, t ethlehem would have to
take drastic action just to remain in s competitive position*
Pausing a moment, let us ask,"Why did ... fceel tcquire
Consolidated ;teel in the first place?" The »er ls of
shifting markets. It costs a lot of money to ship steel from
Illinois to California. As the mid-west - western markets
grew, with every indication of a much larger growth in the
future, IT.y. Steel re. uirea mills In the area to compete in
orice. To buila such plants was costly and a long process —
^Collins, op.oit .
* >*— ,m !——

"T'T
the result was merger. '
•apgers for protection might also include mergers for
survival. These tan include industries having high unit costs
and declining volume as in coal, or mergers just to etop losses
as in overproduced industries such as textiles, or losses from a
failing business. One of the most compelling of these, survival
l
often changes whole industries and often the meaning of company
names.
Armstrong Cork any is a fine example, ks the costs
of producing cork products rose ana their use was continually
diminished, ..rmstronp had to look for diversification to stay in
business. Today through the process of merger only 10 per cent
of the products sole hy the company contain cork, roducts
accounting for the other two hundn-.- llion dollars in sales
run the gamut from rugs and firebrick to plastics and munitions.
This wai merger for survival in its finest sense and the result
is a reputable concern adding much to the American business scen^.
In commenting on mergers for protection, the route of
horizontal and vertical acquisitions have to be explored. Hori-
zontal mergers often are for diversification into other lines.
These make a firm less vulnerable to the changing cycles of a
single industry. I oreover, such diversification in plants or
products, laakai a flw .ore able to compete in all areas of the
V'.O
^Discussions with W, . »lkcr« Vice President for
Accounting, united States Steel Corporation, Pittsburg, Penn-
sylvania, personal interview, November, 19 '4-
1 iscussions with I, Vayne Keller, Controller, T strong;
Cork Co., Lancaster, Pennsylvania, personal interview, October f
1954

nation* Lo; lent In 3 ad textiles ;
- the arei
,
but with studied r
>llar tir. various regions sueh employment
in on 1 not be serious. ;oo 3f merger for
'icat 'West fch
i Co. snt
on the railroj 11 i lurvival, tnd fch ;his
eorpor . . og in industrial oj . uipment
was the protection t a loo tother suoh example
onal Jo. , of
tional Gypsum wanted to b lor fi trenc . bhe
construction bu o. If the trend w a t sos-cement
products they would bo ready.
A prime es .e of the protection that hoy 3rs
can brin ;ly offered in the automotive ustry. It
is .1 to bri : at oompleti is evt;ry three years
with miner dressing up in the intervenini rs. .ithin the
General Motors Corporation e leh Jivision has full operating
authority to make such decisions as they aeein necessary to pro-
duce a profit* 11 divisions compete with eaeh other as com-
pletely as with "outside" competition.
In 195o Oldsmobile broke tradition ana risked large
investments in a change over to a new model in two years,




brii '" Lr 1958 ' " In 1954. The resul tcn-
.-
ijfjjjg ;-« + c r -: - could be termed their finest
tr« ' t of I Id .not m->" 1 ? Their
cnt tc i u the 1 ulk of the Old
rr ' " ' ' for 1 -• )ivlsion ind in addi-
re th son t J \- ;j c* oia tomers
baoJ '
; oi in 1955 is inc. ... To f 1
Hotera Or jor tion these two c 4 , . jrely t ch other.
ever , the wrs t by Fonts- a 3© by
it with &o protection
all • 3 sastrous i^nd Haste was required to merge for sur-
vival. It say not ever recover. mi t tk - s big eoapany
t -e
,
but to a C
.; a
spell ruin. ^
VerticO acquisitions are also a prot Ive device. To
sure ; ration sill go forward and acquire
tribution. '.'. .arc ..u ply, or to obtain cheapex
;• materials in ttl©» would go b i tc the mines or pro-
duction facilities. Pood 'on cf California
found ; ve ... Is th* ition of havij go vertically
a result of an allied merger. .re
Gprayer & Chemical Co., a bulk supplier of insecticides* TL.
move was reported to be for diverslfic - aid be
horizontal r in a different product ,.ce Food
ehiaery owned the eo« ./, aver, the souroe of x m beriali
^3D1 kcussi aa «itlj r. •". F. ffardy, Director of iroced-
urea and Methods , Gener : rs ( .trait, b!ichl{
personal inters . , )eee iber, 1954.

1for ins sides became r'jc^ that for survival fcb rporation
wag required to r:ovo vertically 3nd obtain Westvae© Cor| .
,
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. I ring ec 3it : era
required nouses; houses required re isj . aired gro-
cery stores; ehildren required . . bank^
established* h vor ; can
endless , ju; in the two a bove no slt« ve ...
g 5-26
fisibls. .
ie of the sost access .
.
1] rotectiv \ c« is
the sssu] i of c administrative L ip»
Top m to find, especially for the one man family
corporation* It there are no sons, fch oblem ;
Florshe jiji Shoe 0< ... i Id »c Intern Oo.
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Florshelm.*'7 In the Qlin-Mathieaoa merger, in addition to cer-
tain aspects of estate taxes already mentioned, a compelling
reason was. given ;s Olin's need for m sment . Spencer Clin,
one of the two owners, wished to retire. As there k%ere no heirs
to csrry on the business for the future, the merger itaa neceasery
in order to obtain the brilliant leadership of the young president
of Msthieson.^8 In the merger, also, of two of the largest b«nks
in *«ahington, D. C, the Hamilton Nations 1 nd thi fcional
Bank of Washington, the need for capable executive management
waa demonstrated ." s
The desire for market control .—Un ( u e s t ionably , ma ny
•writers might fill pMges with discussions of acquisition* ever
the years that were mad* merely for monopoly purposes. Undoubt-
edly there have been mergers in the current crop that would fit
this definition. It is obvious, however, that no firm would
admit to such a purpose for publication.3 The section is in-
cluded to note that this may be &n Important consideration.
Legal Reasons
Legal conditions have added to the bidding for firms*
In the banking business, brunch banking is restricted by law in
many localities, oince br?.nch hanking is becoming the bread nd
butter of the Banking industry the only way to get in on the





^Statement by Barnum L. Colton, President, The Hatic
Bank of faahiogton, Washington, D.C., pan il interview, Decem-
ber, 1954.
30 uthor f s note: One major firm admitted that such i
the Case in one of their Requisitions. They .-ere unable to




diversification it offers la to merge. 31
Another legal eonsJ titruat laws that
are a. to fester a< otitic . die this la in no way the
3tor that it was In the 1897 -IS ! I
-
;
, I : at
out that it is no less true today t. t the turn cf the cen-
tury, iThet can't be done with eompetltors accomplished by
merger. The Federal trade Coi I sioa disclosed their contempt
for this in i ;:
. . . Both th ' terman tot :nd the Federal Trade Commis-
- Q let c tcet by means of
mutual onderstandiE r agreement competitors; but
if the Some objective is x I through the
;
: ;rchase of
physical property it 3 ful, in absence of monopoly, and
the Anti-trust agencies ;;re pc I et. . . . Thus
the paradox is presented that the more effective is the
enforce of th t collusion mpetitors
,
the greater is the Incentive to achieve the same objective
through pure
,
tion, nd : :r.32
In blc tz it- by the Commission
:,ve , I . surts tl iv« itrlbut tc the wave of
mergers. is ..ill 33 - , ,T decision a
fce: bJ felons. Cf this Justice Douglas
in i: . atcd
:
read into the
antitrust laws have favored rather than discouraged monopoly.
Sly
. I. Garcia, "Ben
5
rgers ,"
The Washington Post and Times Herald , oeetember 5, 1954, fin -
c : > ge .
^Federal ?r 1 Lssfon, '" r Tient: A
Somma ry Report , " op.cit . , p . Z .




bOT as a C .use of Mergers
Labor Unions have bee foster i] merger;.
The high labor c ber automobile manuf c
turers forced 3 ices to here it could not compete
and merger wa bb result. In addition, . r can extract a
higher wage in Industries aopoly or near monopoly exists,
price competition isn't a strc, ctor, and ^rs aren*t
opposed. vhere Industry is pressured for increased .^ages ye ;r
after ye r one of the solutions to the sque profits is
ccsib! nations of firms, 30 that price east be controlled.
John L. . s, when commenting on mergers within the
coal industry said:
. . .they merged a number of smaller mines, mechanized,
plowed ba< out s9 million into their sd as a
result have made money. 84
Th- re* should pre than passing;
net ice. r< ' tie of the most e that firms
e rry . It is often st ted that you can't live ith j ;
you c l*t liv< t it. Tf v '- i - expense in
there is opportun-
4
! I v, rowing firm
rch. The ti hat it would taka to
- v> ' o n v i &© put the
fina so fax " J bites eareh would no longer
bo re i " I at of Sharp & Dohme
H^ohn L. I Li , "Labor" , Fortune, Noveuber, 1954, p. 78
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when %bn it merger with Merck „:nd their fine research divi-
sion. 35
long with res be tt . The meeting of the
minds between Diamond tells this story.
Delie h;d patents but needed the 1201a technology that Diamond
offered. On the other hand p tent rights to meet
competition. The result .. srger*^"
In the rt Lft to brand products and
nation Ivertising c. ay firms u -J. The small,
perfect competitor, one .. business was unable : pa »ith
product research, national public relations, national television
and radio coverage, market surreys, th d ring of commercial
films, a the staging of television . If the firms ware
not able to do the job the busine. g . ased on to those who
could. It took a sizeable firm, with many quality executive.,
and well heeled pocketbooks to give the service demanded. The
re suit 9 vye re me r ge r «*"
In the discussions on the reast for merger, less
emphasis was pieced on the savings involved by large scale opera-
tions then on the more concrete examples of profits, taxes, sur-
vival, ^nd protection. In the history of the merger movements
there hap never been an indicatic luring depression periods










December 6, 1952, V? . 43, 44.

Ok-*
great combine for the pui cf the fcer effici-
ency that n uia result. . uite the ooj . ars appeal1 when
business Is tt Its best* .<e must look elsewhere
r the cause of these ictions.
It Is believed that v the current
wave of mergers Is the del >n the i of industry
to keep up »ith competition ; Lrit of success-
ful business* The stocks ."lent as he
appears. He, and ttu of Directors, tlert up-to-date
man nt
.
:ts sua dividends retain m nt at higher
better p< ion plans* The f&ste it est rofit-
y to meet tition an<3 gr ..ems is through merger!
•
T
. Frefl f^estoa in su up his re gt* r
mergers ©oneludea it i that the folio L* ere most
important:
(1) An unpreee jd hi -time tax structure.
lc -earn a t oks.
3) a desire to achieve rapid e ion in order to
*
, market .38




"Gentlemen, our attorneys inform me, happily, that the
Sheria et, t cl.
, the Celler Act, TC
sre for the moment... ah. ..well, let me say... in this
Instance, at least . . .er . • ^inoperative ." For- " rovember,
1954
The history cf the legal att to control the growth
of business I©< not m ood reading either for th 1 .vers or
the business nei . The best that can be said is that neither of
them can predict the next decision of the court.
That t. of 1 re required for the conduct of
business is icce ted even by business, itself* The basis for
the laws that ire ac part of the statutes or fc United states
is best described by Sherman R. Bill, Chief .Project .ittorney, of
the Federal Trade Commission. He c itea:
This government is corimitted to the maintenance of a
free oof berprlsc by historic economic
policy. One of the basic i is adopted to strengthen and
preserve that system sc the antitrust 1 . , ere aspect of
wnicn li rtieularly with mergers and acquisitions,
?c v ' have long been reci ' :ertj 'or effect
on the competitive structure c srican economy, and as
hard ag i nherent raonopolj stlo tende n.ci es .
It has often been Id tb t there 5 dual responsibility
between the FTC and the Department of Justice in the handling of
s under antitrust statutes* This respi llity at times




r i before the





-ears to overl ; ad at other times seems entirely separate.
Of this Charles E. Crandey, of th< tt tel:
Tou rtro nt of Justice ind
the Commission have .jurisdiction in antitrust Blatters* I
thir ; : the distinction rk of the two agencie
in that field has he oil stated, first by the Supreme
Court in the Cement c n
,
52 • 83: •11- 11 con-
duct violative of the Sherman lot may likewise come within
'air trade practie< ederal Trade
Commission let, the eon ot necessarily true. It
has " been recc ed that there r ny unfair me the
of competition that do no1 sume the roportiona of the
i c. viol tions»* Cur C , F. Howrey,
has explained the difference in the functions of the tv»o
encies as folio 'The job cf the Department of Justice
is to be or ily that ol utor. The Commission on
the other hand was at to practice prevent itive laa through
ministrative and regulato] les, ell as by the
initiation and conduct of idvers ry proceedin i . Congress
foresav.', ana in fact Intended, some mutual i- Lsibility,
but not mere duplication. Both agencies were fee work in the
sane field, but with different toi I . ? rk does not
duplicate or overlap the work of %h partment of Justice.
very eloj liaison bet ies is maintained
to prevent my such result.^
The jurisdiction of the FTC is limited to the Clayton let
and the Federal Trade Commission -ct. The jurisdiction, of the
Department of Justice is limited to tr ct and the
Clayton Act. It can be seen, therefore, that both agencies can
proceed under the Clayton Act. Effective liaison is required in
the latter instance.
Complaints to either agency may be brought by parties
believed injured by merger or a proposed merger. In other






Federal Trade Commission, "The Federal Trade Commission and Your
try,". (3 ! ] - Contractors
Asso., inc., October 30, 1954.) p. 3.
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although only a fraction of the total number of mergers th it
come to their attention oan be looked Into. It is for this
rt pe of setting prece-
dents .
Inv t .1 by the form
of a letter bo th< ' ' Lnfor-
neerning the r or proposed j C after suit-
lee that t] s P€ : c use to
ued , testimony under
r t3 i taken, ed on the record r , Lf it
deems w c ' ! orders issue • The FTC has nc author
ity tc r dis prove i Lor to consummation, but
its duty is to measure the probable effect the merger I
been ; ooomplj shed
.
On receipt of a cease ana desist order s firm may "con-
;t n to such decree or it may i thin 60 days from the date of
the service request in a U.S. Court of Appeals that the order be
set aside. The Court then has the power to affirm, modify or
set aside the Commission's order. The decision of the Court of
Appeals may be brought to the Supreme Court by either party. If
no appeal is taken, the order becomes final. If later violated,
the matter is given to the Attorney General and a civil or crimi-
nal penalty action la instituted in a District Court. Violations
of the antitrust laws can ba brought in equity with civil law,
or, if deemed warr , criminal prosecution can be Instituted.
The Commission bring tses resulting in oe ise and desist
oraers unuer civil lam. In merger cases Lties imposed
result in I. i of dissolution unla ilful viols Lion is
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Involved* If it weren't for the Ion;; costly c .-. of court
trials , 01 of dissolution .: off lers in no
worse posltloi bhan the; j r . ms
like snt, but lth b ; of demarcation
betv„e : .. Le* nd "non-i
,
nd because
y c se r br s test e . Ity might be
tCt.: ll.
TC cannot bar ; . Ivance, the Department




of :. pre ose< t Ldered a
violation, firms in 1 ubtedly proceed in a
oner as rder had been " : .
Th of Justice does not use the procedure
followed by the Commission. Cases 3 ;ed by the Depart-
ment are handled through the courts in leg •edings.
Th
pointed out in the ''history of hergers," the
1880' a a rapid growth in the trust as 1 . of business
control. That such giants as the standard Oil Company under
John D« Rockefeller needed to be checked was almost unquestioned.
The first formal action against such mei be
credited t< states that had p .a^ea mtitrust laws prior to
18&0. ° However, the Congress was not £ 13 in







naonly been termea tb i titru ;t. The purpose h










declared to no illegal . . .
Every rs LI j Lisa, 02 apt
to monopolize or combine or oonspir* ther person or
pi j i . rt - . . jreo ...mong
i or iltb for 11 be deemed
lilty of r • * •
Section 3. . . , ition In the form of
tru ie, or conspire cjj
,
in restraint of trade or
commerce in any Territory of r. Tilted it- te or the district
of Columbia, or In r i int e; rce between
territory or Territor'- 3 ay tate or Ststes
or tJ riot of C< bis, i it] foreign nations, or
between t] Lstriot of Colt r States or
f orsj, . '.
, is :ec
There has been < ~ ble c. ! on through fche yeara
to the nt of fchg Goj v n Act
Some hare said th t ion to prohibit .. 2 1 combina-
tions that monopolized . German, I er, a
It only at U ful c; tions . • . This bill
' -•
: nd labor,




' view to pre-
vent competition, or for the reotr Lnt of trade, or to in-
f the con-
sumer .°
The first test ease to come under the new Act was that
of t merioen Sugar Befining Company, through a ion:; roceos
of intricate share transfers, certificate transfer id purchases
2456-7
*K.,_, . 3ode, - bile .1.
Jbili. Debates on Trusts, Si Congressional Record
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by 1892 the firm ' ed to obt itrol of 98 percent of
the ref J .try
.
: ;:
.'or tfc snt of
Justice* The art dee! iiermen Act
by holding ; , tion »a; oly in manufacturing
but not . i
1 bate, £ "primarily"
only pr< q or manufacturing, sold
and . it olve "trade,"
it Congress's power to regulate,
id out. : ads of t: . [t tot until
1948 in the : r Co.
ease that of ti irt reversed, 7 although it
whs evident 3 6 early as 1904 that tv decisions of the court
would not adhere to the strict i rotation given in the Knight
case
.
Industry \. encouraged to fern combinations, well
tenowij t they he backing of ti ^me Court.
Tn addition, the federal admi lso believed
t their power fee act I i been stripped. Owe
says, "In December of 1895 the Attorney General declared that
combinations and monopolies eould not be reac ander the oher-
Act merely because they .ere combinations and monopolies, nor
because they engaged in art, rce as one of the




"] Sugar Co .
,




incidents of their business."8
The Department of Justice had more fortune in the next
case before the courts involving c . .• .. -ti i ns . In the Addyston
Pipe Pool ease it was determined that the combination was formed
for the purpose of dividir. rketa and sharing the benefits of
higher prices and it was ordered dissolved
.
Again the government was successful, this time in the
dissolution of the Northern Securities Company. This holding
company, organized in 1901, gained control of the entire railway
transportation system in the northwest* The court held that "the
mere existence of such a combination nd the powers acquired by
the holding 1
,
company as its trustee eom titute a menace to and a
restraint upon the freedom of commerce." 1^ This decision went a
long way toward offsetting the previous effect of the Knight
decision.
The case of real importance to the sponsors of the Shermaln
Act came in May of 1911, ..hen the Standard Oil Company was orderejd
dissolved. lthcugh this victory meant much to the proponents
of competitive enterprise, the case also meant just as much to
those desiring expansion through merger. The ruling of the
court added to the law by Injecting the "rule of reason." while
the Sherman let outlawed all restraints of trade the interpreta-
tion of the Court outlawed only those that were "unreasonable."
"Owens, op.cit ., - 465.
.dystcn Pipe an teel Company v. United States*
175 U.S. 211 (1099)
10 193 U.o. 197.
^Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 1 (1911)
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The "rule of reason" became the doctrine of the courts
and in acme cases even went 30 far as to accept the idea that,
while a combination was not legal, the effects of dissolution
would be of greater consequence to the public interest. 1^ The
difficulty with such an application of law is that there is no
longer a law. ,-vhat remains is a principle which must be adminis-
tered with judgment based on economics and public policy.
As the Sherman Act was designed to outlaw the trusts
there were no direct provisions dealing with the new menace to
industrial concentration, the hoi aies. In addition,
it offered nothing in the form of preventive maintenance for
mergers. Thus in 1909, attempts were made to obtain amendments
to the Act. ° These attempt-; .ere designed primarily to make
the Sherman Act more specific. It t the act
was broad enough to outlaw any c: ation, good or bad, and that
it should, therefore, be more definite in its provisions.
It i*t until 1914 that sponsors of -n "antiheldia
company" act ;„crc successful and the Claytc: ci ssed. 4
Section 7 is of principal concern to this studj nd it reads:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital of another corporation engaged also
in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition between the corporation
whose stock is so ae aired and the corporation making the
acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or
.. fees v. Unit 1 Corporation,
£51 U.S. 417 (March 1, 1920)
.
^Amending Anti-Trust Act, op.clt .
l4U.S. Code, Title 15, See. 18.
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community, or tenc to create a monopoly of any line of
cosBiaerce.
Ho corporation shall acquire , directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of
two or sore colorations engaged in commerce where the effeqt
of such acquisitions or the use of such stock by the voting
or granting of proxies or otherwise, say be to substantially
lessen competition between such corporation, or any of them,
whose stock or other share capital is so acquired, or restrain
such commerce in any section or community or tend to create
a ironopoly of any line of commerce.
This section of the Act specifically prohibited the ac-
quisition of stock, when such acquisition vettld subs dly
lessen competition between the acquiring anc acquired concerns 01
if it was considered to be "in restraint of trait** Thus it is
seen that the new law was silent on the acquisition of ts as
distinguished from acquisition of capital stock. The Bergen of
that period were usually accomplished by stock purchases.
The deficiency in not specifically covering acquisitions
of assets soon become I >nt and rergers continued unabated.
The error in not including the acquisition of assets in the law
and the words "substantially lessen" and "tend to restrict" *?ere
more than the courts could contend with and little was to come
of the Act.
The year 1914- was also notable for the Federal Tr
Coir^ission <^ct and the establishment of the Federal Trade . -
mission under the act. The 'ose of this body was to provide
a means of extending control over practices in restraint of
trade and to ears? on investigations to provide the basis for
further legislation.
The salon's control was intended both to prevent
the growth of monopoly through "unfair methods of atl-
tion' - Btploltativ tctlcei of monopoly -lireet*
ly. The eozsmlsalon was to hold hearings where Illegal prac-
tices of either sort were suspected, either on its own

6£
~lve c int of injured competitor
,
r. "cease desist orders" where t
tetually were found to be illegal. I t the
commission Vrculd bot i in ch< iCtic.
J elimi; large portion of the ou certainty
out of of the court-, in determining in parti-
cular c 10a totica le" and what "tfnr
onable." 15
The Commission at their purpose as folio.
The Federal Trade CosiaiaaiQ t into being in
e very re -1 sense t: tire, . ithin the fr..<.mev»ork cf cur
Constitution, the right of men to enter business without
illegal re Fictions, y their perser-
ver.nce, diligence and ability, to re ... returns *hich
the prl enter- ut U tnest .. re
Hilling to t.ke trie Ineii
Cnoe agjiin the first 'te~t ease" under a restraint of
tre4e act was to backfire for technical reasons. -, ry H6,
1918 the FTC issued a "cease and t" ©rtfei Lust .merle
Agricultural Chemical Company IOC the Brc*n Company. The oh rge
was that the effect of American 1 a acquiring the stock of Broun
Company "may be to su; t 11 illy lessen competition ... or
tend to create a monopoly in line of commerce." The case failed
on the grounds "th t there was no shewing of proof that the
acquired and c airing c openies ..ore competitor.. required
under the ,ot."i7 Ones again the problem of aritln t tut
tc Include all possible situations ana demonstrates.





17Federal Trade Com; . rioultural
Che id the Brc By, socket 79 ((etcher 8,




The Department of Justice, The Federal Trade Commissi en
id the Court
3
The early reports of the FTC do not .indicate much succ
In the ability to prevent mergers. 13 In addition, the govern-
ment had two serious setbacks in the American Can Company-^ and
the United States Steel Corporation oases* In both oases disso-
lution was desired but the courts refused to so order. *® These
cases established the common law that size alone was not improper.
The Court ruling in the steel case held that the government's
contention was one of condemnation of size and stated that "we
must adhere to the law and the law does not a ere size or
the existence of unexerted power an offense."
The first bright spot on the horizon came on February
1923 when the Supreme Court aenie.'i i petition by the -\ luminum.
Company of Aosrioa and required the company to divest itself of
the stocle of the newly acquired Cleveland Metal Products Co.,
"-1
which the FTC h -reviously ordered.*' This auoot a short-
lived. The Aluminum Company claimed a debt of six hundr
thousand dollars due it from the Cleveland Metal Products Co.,
end the FTC was unable to prevent the .luminum Co. from acquir-
ing, at execution sale, the properties involved in the ori
^Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission, 1918,
1919, 1980, 1921, 19ZZ* {.Washington; Cover Printing Office,
June 30, Yearly)
.
19Unitea States v. American Can Co., SS5Q Fed. 859,
903 (D.C., lift*)
^United States v. United States Steel Corporation,
£51 U.S. 417 (Karen 1, 19£G).
2lA luminum Company of America v. Federal Trade Commission
£84 Fed. 401 (19££).
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suit. Thus, the Aluminum Company aow owned 100 per cent of
what the 7TC ordered them to divest of when they only own
66 • sr cent.
As if thi t enough, the Commission lost three more
es in roA :--3 and th rerae Court's ruli; ere oakl
mockery of the apparent Intent cf the Congress in the
ct:: . The only salvation to fefc t the Commission ..
that the Court continued split in its opinions • The majority
opinion of ti jrt in the Th toner case held that J
Ti. Lication to of a competitor's
property and business obt prior to ction by the
Commission, even though thi brcu bout through stock
unlawfully held. 1'4
The Court in making its ruling on the Swift esse aai
. . • the Commission i: ity to require one
who h ' titl osaesaion of ro-
perty before proceed ir. pa be :: nat it -se
of the same, alti i soured tr ] b en unlawful purchase
of the ateak
<
The Commission viewpoint en th 1.
,
.
ut fora t& by I
Chief hroject attorney, waas
Under these . . . judicial in f the ute
Ity or illegality of o ti Heated
not upon the effect t might flow from it, but
proa .hich the Cosi b the factjs
ragardlng it , it.
The result cf the decisions of the art in the
Th itcher ift c ;,ore bo rule that th. ytcn »ct aid
-ibid, 35^ Fed. C61 (19E4).
ift & Company, OF (cd) 598; ivestc oat Company,
5FTC 417; Thatcher fg. Cc, ST (fid) 615. v. Com-
aion.
^Thatcher .fg. Co. v. La Commission If
561 (19&6)«
^5Ibic
"Siiiii^ op.alt t. •.. .
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not forbid a corporation from eliminating another concern pro-
vided it acquired the assets and liquidated the oompetitior
before the FTC could proceed against it!
Undaunted by its defeat in the cases el \&f discussed,
the FTC on Lay 27, 192? again set about endeavoring to comply
with its charter to issue "cease and desist orders,"
. , .
"where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so
acquired and the corporation making the acquisition , . »• Thus
came about the FTC v. V. Vivandou Inc., with the FTC charging an
unlawful acquisition of the stock and other share capital of the
Alfred K. Smith Company and The Parfumerie Uelba Company, which
shortly thereafter acquired the stock of the I elba Hfg, Co..
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Mew York City, in
reversing the FTC st ted*
The question on the appeal is whether the competition
between these companies has been substantially lessened by
reason of the stock acquisition and ownership referre£ qto
and whether the public has been injuriously affected .
must consider the extent of the trade carried on by
the three companies and compere it with the volume of busi-
ness carried en by their competitors previous to the period
of ownership of the stock, and endeavor to ascertain whether
the public interest has been affected. ^9
Apparently oblivious of the courts, once again in 1934
a case of ortance to the Co ission was brought to test
57
Federal Trade Commission v. V. Vivandou, Inc., Docket
1464 FTC 306





The complaint of tha FTC v. b and lectrlcal
vjed the ith unlawfully
acquiring the voting two «* les whlefc ^c-rv angagaa' i£
th« irittj crevices.
Although) on f. ,
:
;Cvlj th< C was upheld by the -Is
t| dth the previous history i eoisicns, it iot
acted to hi ustic verir Fia^jority
.nion of the Suprf -art in this manneri
n lac I hority to issue any
order again. petitioner* . , . oldin ny
could I ' fter seat**
l% filed, by : for that
8 all $ ore-. If it o
•ted itself the tr could immedi I




It is pi to note that & seldom re-
stored competition, rlhat laws should b<* to revent rcer'
rather than to unscramble thai ia on 'e.
The ToKporar: r ' In OS ing
on th« situation i i "The
ram art 1 * his have
v.tae went on
to Ion that It wai sf engross to
prohibit total er-
wise t Lnion, waul fetla moaning,
While Lttaa to the courts in t
3 Arrc- ..-trie v« 1 Tra<$e
trary Rati Is Cowait' allograph
Lnting fj'5-ce, 19*1) » P« 74
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area of merger law, it aid point cut that they had little guid-
ance from common law, nd "the details aye multitudinous, the
ts perplexing in thoir intricacy •• After miking sue:. Lo«
gles for the court they want oa to says n * * • monopol;
the degree of control the me Court deems anlawful »*** The
Federal Trade Commissi on* a views on t
The effectiveness of the or otion 7 . .tie-
lly impaired by decisions of the Supreae Court* The Court
, failed to accord full recognition to the "incipiancy doc-
trine*1 of competitive eff
.
J 3 same
test of a, itial laa» of competition lioable in
Sherman Act cases.*54
The Present Law
In 1945 th. reme Court dealing with the FTC was more
liberal when Kr« Justice Douglas wrote;
The Commission haa wide discretion in its choice cf
re&Q&y deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful praetio
in this :.re rce. Here, aa in the case of or
of other admin:" rable statutes,
judicial revia limited. It ex- further than te
aaeel .• the Coaaiaaioa ofcftda ilo nt
in it r dy. 35
48 the Supreme Court issued ffirm^tion
of the (- 3 ion' ad ruled th t the cint
system - rice-f ixi Aich v. n of t
Clayton tat* .;hilv: at I'irst It lleve t I victory for
the Commission had been wen, it actually arietta def
Ibid .. p« **•
^Hlll, oojcil.




for their attempt to control mergers. The ca... ted from 1^37
and was br t by the system or charging freight in the
cement industry, ) It hough it was s test case against system
used in many it rlae«
atwaan the period I9i 7 cisicn of the ccurt
in 1948 is such i ve of mergers ha cement Industry
that by 1§48 sixty r-er cent of the industry's capacity was in
of ten firms sail IS throu at the country
36
and ther o further ne* r basing-point r>ctice .
the iaeision of the court forced merger,, i t in their
•tat ' this th.it try. ether industries that
freight coots from central for the urposa of
being m Itive, o were f to loo similar opportuni
ties for investment in : a other th th t they were pro-
due n. That ateel was costly to ship I ,; been dl -
cussed, .. nd re ^ui r on the spot mills were no leaa
re uirsaant of the stoel industry than the cement industry
result of t rreme Court ruling on "beta! lut" pricing*.3
™
In V: i of J , ,o. t important
titru 9« befor c urt in yaars involved th rw at*
attaapt fcj rohibi' c aisiti : colu taal by the
United Statai il Co.- . rity Lou of the
court held
aral J t Commission, Th< • r ; r '.•eve. ; t : A
c-umtn^ry Report . cr.cU t. p*
r«h#rd , op«oit *

^9
It is not for courts to determine the course of the
tion*s economic development • Economist r» may recommenu
,
the legislative and executive branches \ oh&rt,
courses by ™hich business can seek to reduce costs
increase production so that a higher it rd of living Bay
be available to all* . . . Ho directive of Congress h
appeared of a public policy that forbids, per se, an expan-
sion of facilities of an exist in, ny to meet the needs
of nee sjarfcets of a community, whet ha t community '
tion-aide cr county-wide. ... If businesses are to be
forbidden from entering into different stages of production,
that order mast come from Congress, not the courts. 38
Justice Douglas in the dissenting opinion states}
It is important because it reveals the say of t ita of
monopoly poser—the precise phenomenon it which t
let RSS aimed. Mere se BSYe the pattern of the evolution of
the great trusts. Little, independent units are gobbled u
by bigger ones. At tl» ay number of "sound business
ressons" appear why the sale to or merger sits the trust
should be made*
The moat frequent re; iven for mergers are tl
they prevent waste and promote efficiency, reduce overhc ,
dilute Bales sad advertising costs, spread risks, etc. . . .
But that these advanl are largely illusory has long been
recognized. . . .
In ta< lead case the court refused a Department
of Justice request to order sale of properties 1 ; by the com-
pany in the United States* The majority opinion of the court
It is not for the courts to realign ireot effec-
tive sad lawful competition where it already exist I needs'
only to be released from restraints that violate tne anti-
trust lavs* To separate the B &g units of going con-
cerns without more supporting avidenee than has been pre-
sented here to establish either the need for, or the feasi-
bility of, such separation would asv unt to la ;buae of
discretion.^9
ice 1945, legislation had been pending in both the
Senate and the House to amend Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
^United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 1.34 tf»S« 5£6 (194$)





The bill was Introduced to the 79th (Democratic) and 8oth epub-
lican) Congresses but never reached the floor for debate. It
wasn't until 1950 that the amendment desired by the Commission
became law.
The House Committee report on the Amendment was clear in
its intention and said:
But in the proposed bill, as has been pointed out above,
the test of the effect on competition by the acquiring and
the acquired firm has been eliminated. One reason for this
action was to make it clear that this bill is not intended
to prohibit all acquisitions among competitors. But there
is a second, which is to make it clear that the bill applies
to all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and con-
glomerate, as well as horizontal, which have the specified
effects of substantially lessening competition.. .or tend-
ing to create a monopoly. If, for example, one or a
number of raw-; atarial producers purchases firms in a fabri-
cating field (i.e., a "forward vertical" acquisition), and
if as a result thereof competition in that fabricating field
is substantially lessened in any section of the country, the
law would be violated even though there did not exist any
competition between the acquiring (raw material) and the
acquired (fabricating) firms. The same principles would,
of course, apply to backward vertical and conglomerate
acquisitions and mergers.^
The original law had the competitive test between acquir-
ing and acquired concerns and did not spell out the desired
meanings of "section of the country." The Senate report on the
subject explains the intent of the Congress by saying:
Although it is, of course, impossible to define rigidly
what constitutes a 'section of the country 1 certain broad
standards reflecting the general intent of Congress can be
set forth to guide the Commission and the courts in their
interpretation. What constitutes a section will vary with
the nature of the product. Owing to the differences in the
size and character of markets, it would be meaningless from
an economic point of view to attempt to apply for all products
^UHouse of Representatives Committee Report No, 1191,
8lst Congress, 1st Session, p. 11
4
^Senate Report No, 1?75> 8lst Congress, 2nd Sess., p. 5.
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a unif' n of sectior , .'• tfeer .uch a c
were based upon miles, population, income, cr ether unit of
measurement
•
Motion ^hich aotlid be economic:;].ly fi-
. arable pr<
tools* mi ell be me a ningle a. uct,
as milk.4 !
It is ll i. ly
lessen competition, aa ^ell as tta ich tend tc create
,
.-.ill b© unlawful if they
fact ! y line t < , t line of
commerce 5 <e part of t>: ay of the OOZ
I tion.4^
The folio from T ttee report!
Tb t of tit ion cr tend-
ix. monopoly ale
err ere tl oified effee ear oc
is purpose i . > bi 11 i po-
test -^tition ' of coffiflierca in each section of
the C( untry. 4;i
ere have been c th.t t I the
.Aaendme; ct were not idually nee ry, had
it not been for the Court . ace t. ot gave all ti
power necessary to prevent aonopolies in rt. Lnt of trade.
&SS rejert
The bill tended to permit Intervention in such
cumulative proc effect aa Ltlofi H :; be
a significant reduction in the vigor of - tit ion, even
thou - nount
to C' tion in t* < of fci I , a* N ";v,
or oonatituta an ttteas U . uch n aff
rise in r in
terl 1 Ive ,e
.
• iti on, .'
in the relstj enterprise g 5tio;n
to sun aet 11 petit*
thi bo desisive, u in t- r of
p» 8.




Iport »©« 1775, c- .cit .




between buy* . oprive their ri- of a
fair oh nee t ta#44
The te rc ; crt 5
1© Committee <riiih tc make it cle^r th.t the bill I ot
lat revert to tb« - ot teat. Intent acre,
as In -yton ,ct, 0-
tic tendencies in their ineipienoy ell before t
ve obtuiney eueh effects aa v. cult; ^u hermen Act
proc /a5
<lng mere specifically on the fr*o t< Of 1X3 ity
provided in the \ct,—that la aul feial lessening of competition
or tc onopoly, the i.,
:
The a-. Illegality ^re I to be slinil r
to thi oourl ied :. - 1 c
same la; a use sotione of the Clnyt t.45
The Commission in ranoe to t.
among Industrial and r tioi e-
uant atlffllng of competition, Congres at J 7






1914. .fiction 7 :' to
prevent tta truction ion of • Q thr*
mergers of c . or thrcu
by one corporation of tin 93 l I in the c
stock o:; feltoa?a« crnorly,
the prohibition* of 5«otion 7 were
'.ion of capit &ent appliea ti.
tc 1**'
"The Commission took uction to provide the f ulle
laaure or ;nt poesibl .1 it.. limitations.46
44 j ••!,.
45 >rt No. 1775, o:;.cit «. p« 4.
4® present <tiv aittee Raport, c; .cit .
^"lanoal Report c • Federal Trade Commission, 1951,
op •oit .





and on June 16, 195L, instituted its first formal procceain
under tl. section 7 of the Clayton ct.
U , [no* | was I ice history in the realms
of mergers by being cited fc t. of Ballard &
Ballard Co., uff Bakery Mil ion of .fiieri-
tes being in coi; h Pill
bury
,
Inc.. Pillabury . i
flour Mill: its ever
$201, COO, 000. **ith th' a'f it
charged tht t they would ..rol 45 percent of the baking mix
market in t .:..,.. .*®
In addition to the Pillcburv c m , ua U the fiaeal
yeer of 1953 (July 195£ tc June 1958), ti . issued £4
cease and aesist orders unaer the AotJ were issued
in &9 Oases; 15 c tare closed; an in which inveati-
.*erc made and completed totaled 373. 50 It can be seen,
srefore, that the Coamisal tc use the it to




'. Trade commission announc
ed its fir d under the n« nti-m* st tute In rul'
cn t\ lllsbij . opini
vrey, it u ainer' decision disoi.- -
•is, Xne», . . . Kith vie"





tion of bi-fl»rger sect ion of fcl - n ot*»51
I orf laint I by t?
"ner, tion .ry, 1 ri 1 no* r.
rule,.; th t 4 1 "re
(bet competition .. rfer. Pillsbury wee not
permitted to submit ovldO r tc •*
ii holdlj t the Co I i "prima f .cie"
.inst Pillsbury, Chairm




. . . the Commission n. the MsuL lity" $4
: illogalifcy and t the Clayton
Act. There o kftft- jo ox tion of all rele-
rder tc bio e^ ic
cc t corporato mergers and acquisition;*.
I we see it, OtiOB 3 t • Oft the
merger, in it: ir inoipiency and to
dt... Lao their 3 • Ity b; own* re not
the rule of 1 D of the I ct, that 1ft. uj.j bio
restrain of trade, nor an setloi v redhibitions to be
to the list of par jo violation... re in between
is sootion 7, which prohibTta 'may* happen in
i . ticuii | fc t look ' i Ft ^ty, f
to »subst I* economic consequences, ts 'tend*
to a result. the brc a to
the Shon ot reach li Umt r. ts*
.lie these are for fr iflo st - specificity
at be ii*c< tih the •©< ue-
1 of antil i ' ns -
,
I ..ve, be
r.liod on .se-by case basis. Ink tto
is the typo Congres. - ono i set
of foot uffio arman ,ct
but nonet;
,
ime £_£l£» - °*
lot100 7 Of the Clayton &ot*«w
, the e'isy




OOX .• , I j -

75
to be . tc have ito Court I T...
J 9 tt hi lie Oft, .... I : ' ubly gOJ
for t] a« !*•
.
I c ur. I ruled dur: i;.
AgeIns 1 re fl t 113 ury's.
of
. proving
i 1% c ntrolled 75 percent of 'A it industry.
.tistici
. art to pro* t
cello; Tor only 3
,j i I., tind in f .ct h'iu ten taajor ; stitors in the field .53
ihih, *t voire a me: let I -re cedent
for t . ' thlnki: . ble c n
iu.itry ia cone erne .
old "rule of reason" and unless
a&e Court spoil a for antitrust
tot in flagrant i raore than ju t
entration*3*
In reference to t illabury c U ertinent to
note I Bse£, December ,
Lllflbury off Baking Mix Cor oration, i oorpor -
tion formed Just 1 lerller, cart, asset *ell
as the Juff naae t rig!] tJ a int
Perhaps fch« l •.. ess *or) , i if in so n oner, but
the ftc vvoul-.i fa *• no part of it 'aimed lately cited Pillabury
by saying!
The tale by Pillsburj of a portion of the asset.:, previ-
ously ,e of
DO off Corporation, -as set ,h in Nine
rein, tstitute aion t .,eta
5~ tes v. » 1. (StiFont de Newourr. , 118 F. Sttp.
41 (1953).
S4 Usrrin, or,.ci u, p«
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as to render BOOt the violations of Section 7 of the Claytor
Act, , . »55
The problems of the FTC, the Department of Justice and
the law continued, and notwithstanding the Commission's nr Mic-
tions in their 1951 annual revsort of "the fullest wo s sure of
enforcement" few coses have come to the courts. uotlng from
the 1951 FTC report it reads? "Primarily as a result of the
strengthening of the i*ct, the number of investigations under
Section 7 increa ed greatly during the last half of the fiscal
year." It is noted in the report, however, that only 15 cases
involving all facets of monopoly work were before the courts and
only six cases had been decided in the previous fiscal ye.?r«
None of these were under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The 1952
Annual Report of the Co mission lists 16 cases before the courts
during the year none of which were under Section 7, and the 1953
Annual ort again lists 16 cases during the year with none
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
This dearth of cases being brought to trial may be due
to the ability of the FTC to get "consent decrees" from those on
whom they issue "cease and desist" orders. It may be that the
results of bringing cases to Hlogal law" instead of "adminis-
trative law" had been so unsuccessful that little further hope iiji
this direction could be looked for as a way of stopping mergers 9
although the Commission was proceeding in two other cases beside^
Pillsbury's.^
Federal Trade Commission, ftSOJM nd Supplemental
Complaint of Pocket Ho, 6GC0.
5" Federal Trade Co .ission v. Crown Zellerbach Company
Docket 6l80 and Lauria Brothers and any et. al,, rocket 6156,,
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Thomas H« Christopher, in the Harvard Business
riftw, c^rjrented
:
Tr: •-.i-.ission *as restrietsd la Its inter-
»teti< unfair of c overt
in t: isay the statute
in ac major . ;eed the ciecisic
encies es„to :•© generally subject
tc the whim of th rt.e/
That the Cover: t seem to be
the SSSSa ' - at i
Tube c>. pr« poi i r :
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oy Oemr
vcicec r' by* It set off
icial snd bus' rid. The
eplfiioi t the merger c
c or- to test the 3 -v. . -. . In am-
decision the \ttorne;
... ixth X
tool . 5 ti-tr
laws ... it; . Isenho^er
bar* felon' ! ry basic
. enter;: :>8
In reply t . , . 0r.ee i: sued a st:te.iu
which Midi • tion that th< . . He comftentsjis
The oonl .: of the t ructJve
.1 not U ...teel industry
anywhere # . . . believe that, unl-: action 7 cf the
i by t: t .
way ftxtSRt of
petit:' n the . the ovsr-all effect
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bell ve t ic conn- q of these tmc companii uld
sen oo&petitles in ti: ...-
~ry* ... therefore rev : <athejr
we eill pr^ . . tetter by the
.50
not I at ^epart
meat Of Tustioa is '..ell J? . , vote of 5
to 4, th< b the cose of
. . lteel*s .,c tee] ... er
provi iscussel. . numbar
on© first 2a 1 '>' '- '
-
tax vttl te-< i1 the
n&ii Fairl at in Bet; ' ,12 the e
er 6 1 : , rel til
n c-. u
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r two flra I :ry fight Ir .ut tt
I I | Lfe 1 I ter« 11 of an
X a 111 bf uta« rt Litt
by thi c turt .
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tea v. ColuabJ keel 3©», 184 ; .<• 485 (194£
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A major consideration of Bethlehem >;nd Youngs tohn might
be the 5 to 4 decision of the Supreme Court in the U. S. steel
case. This is small margin on which to base decisions required
in expanding billion dollar organizations.
The Wall street Journal suggests that this latest move
by the Justice Department may be fanfare in an attempt to drm —
tize an effort to slow down the wave of corporate combination .
That such fanfare is going on is unquestioned as article after
article on the subject appears concerning activities of the Com-
3 ion., the Attorney General, and the Congress. The latest of
these was entitled "Democrats to nopolies," and told
of the expectations of the Anti-Monopoly 3ubccmmittee of the
ASSenate Judiciary Committee. It ia certain to become politic 1
before the year is cut.
Commenting on fehia Harris says:
Mr. Brownell's attitude la not likely to stop this mer-
ger movement, now nine years old. Even tn .-.ndment to
the Clayton
. ct in 1950, passed to atop mergers, before they
were made, proves futile. S3
Another major setback, came for tl -vernment on Decem-
ber 3, 1954 after five years cf litigation. Once again the case
did not directly involve a merger but it was of no less impor-
tance to firms already merged or those contemplating such action.
The case involved the attempt by the Department of Jus-
tice to dissolve the combination of Inter* Pont,
6:
-?he Sraning Star, "Democrats to :.tt onopolies"
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few words should be said about the problem of proof It
antitrust cases. Competition is a complex and constantly
changing phenomenon. It has mv®r been sharply defined.
Injury to competition, as distinguished from injury to a
competitor, is sel- ble of proof by direct testimony
and may therefor© be inferred from all the surrounding cire^ia
stances* All antitrust charge may . . . be proved by circum-
stantial evidence, and the circumstanc ay include actions
affecting any of the broad issues of ffaot posed In the com-
plaint.
ny tines the law is violated solely because the law is
not known. We are confident that if the ->rs of an indus-
try participate in th :ing of rul h, for the nest
part, restate and clarify the law, they will better know th€
1 w and, knowing it. will, in general, be anxious to follow
it. Our objective is not to make trouble for the members of
an industry, but to assist the ^rs.of an industry, in
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